In late 2019, the US government passed the Global Fragility Act as part of the consolidated budget appropriations act. The Global Fragility Act is a major attempt to redesign how the United States approaches fragility and stabilization work, with an emphasis on improving the coordination between the US State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense.
The increased availability and lower cost of satellite imagery has made it accessible to civil society in recent years. While universities, think tanks, and nongovernmental organizations are racing ahead to incorporate this form of open-source intelligence (OSINT) into their regular research work, there are a number of unexamined areas that our team at the Open Nuclear Network (ONN) wanted to explore. Are open-source analysts facing ethical dilemmas? If they are, how are they resolved? What resources exist to support them to make such decisions?
This analysis utilizes a machine learning methodology known as topic modeling to identify and uncover thematic trends in Russian presidential speech data from 1999 to 2020.
Since May 2019, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has repeatedly tested two new solid-fuel short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM). Unlike liquid SRBMs such as the SCUD-B/C, the KN-23 and KN-24 missile systems have different designs, means of transportation, and launch methods. However, they have largely overlapping performance and utility. In theory, the longer range KN-23, which appeared earlier than KN-24, should have eliminated the need for the latter.
Researchers and analysts working outside of governments are now able to make remarkable contributions to international security using publicly available satellite imagery. While the open source community has a growing toolbox of technical skills, analysts often lack guidance or a support network when they come across ethical dilemmas. Open Nuclear Network & the Stanley Center convened some of the world's top open source analysts to address these issues.
In an increasingly networked and digital world in which millions of transactions are recorded daily, the potential of data tampering in centralized ledgers that are the primary depository of these records can not be overemphasized. To partially confront this challenge, distributed ledger technologies such as blockchain are growing in global use. This fact sheet builds on this narrative and suggests ways in which block chain can be particularly useful to enterprises in fragile and conflict-affected states.
This report reviews a dozen case studies of business engagement in peacebuilding across a variety of private sector actors, strategies, and time. It was developed as a partnership with UN Peacebuilding Support Office and PeaceNexus Foundation with engagement from the UN Global Compact, and is intended to supplement the UN Peacebuilding Fund Guidance Document on business and peace by providing concrete examples and lessons-learned about where, why, and how businesses have deliberately attempted to contribute to peace and security.
While there is insufficient evidence to prove that North Korea is pursuing countermeasures or penetration aids (penaids), the lack of evidence certainly does not prove that they are not. The technology behind producing penaids — or still more dangerous — multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) is difficult, but not more difficult than what North Korea has already accomplished.
This article provides an overview of North Korea’s approach towards countering US and allied ballistic missile defence. It explains the integral role the two tested Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, the Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15, play for North Korea’s capability for delivering a nuclear weapon to the US mainland, as well as how ballistic missile defense is set up to detect and intercept incoming threats.
This article provides an overview of how states with intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities have considered countermeasures to ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems. Generally, states counter ballistic missile defence by increasing the number of missiles they produce, developing countermeasures and penetration aides such as decoys or chaff — which confuse BMD sensors, or increasing the number of warheads in each missile’s payload.